

**International Peace Institute SIPA Capstone
Workshop: Assessing Post-Conflict and Fragile
States – Evaluating Donor Frameworks
FINAL REPORT - UNCLASSIFIED**



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PART I. Introduction

A. Client Background

The International Peace Institute (IPI), formerly International Peace Academy, is an independent international institution dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of armed conflict. As a policy research institute, IPI's core goals are to inform decision-makers in government and the UN of trends and dynamics in peace and security through policy-relevant research. With approximately 40 employees and a budget of \$8,000,000, IPI channels expert advice from all over the world into the UN system.

IPI's Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Program in collaboration with the Coping with Crisis, Conflict and Change (CWC) program, is conducting a research project with the aim of evaluating the conceptual frameworks, processes, and uses of assessment tools developed by major multilateral and bilateral donors, in order to inform work in conflict, post-conflict, and fragile environments. The goals of this project include mapping the range of assessment tools used by donors engaged in post-conflict and fragile environments, exploring the processes by which such assessments are conducted, and analyzing how the information produced by these instruments influences donor behavior, policies, and programs.

B. Project Introduction

The project discussed in this paper is one piece of an ongoing project taking place under IPI's Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Program. The overall goals of this project were to better understand how conflict and fragility assessments developed by donors, governments and academic institutions influence donor behavior, policies and program development. This project was, in part, delegated to five graduate students matriculated at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). The group of five students divided into two teams in order to conduct a thorough analysis. Vanna Chan and Joyce Pisarello comprised one team that analyzed donor assessments conducted in two countries: Burundi and Sri Lanka. The second team consisted of Ellena Fotinatos, Liat Shetret and Melissa Waits. The goals of the first team were to explore how qualitatively oriented conflict and fragility assessments produced by donor countries vary, how variations impact findings, and how in turn findings impact programming. The latter group sought insight into state fragility indexes and their usefulness through an in-depth analysis of the indicators, methodologies and theoretical frameworks that inform these quantitative analyses. Researching and drawing conclusions separately and then comparing group outputs was an effective method in understanding the relationship between qualitative and quantitative data and how donors and organizations utilize this data to further their agendas.

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PART III. INDEXES

A. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a trend within many organizations, donor countries and think tanks to produce indexes measuring state fragility. This trend in indexing has led to a number of important questions which frame this analysis:

- What was the motive for creating indexes? Was there a particular demand?
- Does their quantitative formulation make them more dependable and robust?
- What are the underlying theoretical assumptions and frameworks behind these indexes?
- Do these indexes inform policy programming? If so, to what extent?

Using the aforementioned questions as a guide for this analysis, we based our research of a select sample of indexes on a specific set of criteria which allowed us to draw meaningful conclusions about the genesis, inner-workings, and usefulness of these measurements. The section below discusses our methodology, followed by our analysis, findings, and recommendations for future research.

B. METHODOLOGY

In this section, we will address our choice of indexes, data sources, specific research methodology employed, and limitations of this work.

Based on a list of fragility indexes provided by IPI (as well as additional research conducted to assess the range of indexes that are available) we performed a preliminary analysis based on a number of criteria, including: definition of fragility, methodology, underlying assumptions, indicators, and data sources. The list of preliminary indexes examined that were not further analyzed is included in the appendix of this work.

Through this preliminary research, as well as consultation with IPI, we then paired down this initial list based on a few key factors. Such factors included scope of the index, data sources, rigor, global focus, and maturity of the work. While this list was significantly paired down, it does provide a framework for possible future research as these indexes mature. Based on these preliminary findings, we focused our analysis on the following organizations: Brookings Institution, Fund for Peace, George Mason University, Center for Global Development, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, Institute for State Effectiveness, World Bank and USAID. The analysis of these organizations was based on both desk research and phone interviews.

The desk research was based primarily on data and literature provided by the respective organizations. Using papers that had been published as well as material publicly available on their websites, we were able to successfully gather enough information to perform this analysis. In addition to this research, in order to better narrate the topic of these indexes, we conducted two interviews on Friday April 17, 2009 which were helpful in informing much of our research and findings. For a full set of specific questions asked, please refer to *Appendix I: Indexes General Interview Script Questions* of this work.

Based on both the desk research and the interviews conducted, we examined our eight chosen

indexes based on a number of criteria which will serve to frame the analysis portion of this section. The criteria were as follows:

- Definition of Fragility
- Underlying Assumptions and Conceptual Framework
- Purpose of Creating Index
- Year Project Began
- Frequency of Index Publication
- Methodology
- Number of Indicators
- Number of Groupings
- Indicator Choice
- Grouping Choice
- Data Sources
- Ranking of Top 15 Most Fragile States

By examining definitions of fragility, underlying assumptions and conceptual frameworks, we were able to further analyze the foundational reasoning that runs through each one of these quantitative works. Through the examination of indicators and groupings, we were able to successfully draw conclusions as to the agendas and priorities of these organizations reflected in their indexes. The methodologies and data sources of these indexes helped us draw conclusions regarding the rigor of these indexes as well as the repetitiveness that might exist between them. Furthermore, by examining each index's listing of the top 15 most fragile states, we are able to draw interesting conclusions as to the role of politics and the weight that certain indicators had over others. Lastly, by examining the frequency of publication, we are informed as to whether this is an ongoing process and also the varied levels of dedication that these organizations have in producing up to date material.

While there were a number of interesting conclusions drawn from this analysis, there were also a few limitations that should be noted. Firstly, while we were able to conduct two interviews via phone, these did not cover all of the organizations we examined. Surprisingly each individual was able to talk in depth about all projects; however, this work would be further informed by detailed interviews with individuals from each of the indexes examined. Another limitation of this work was the confidentiality of some information. While we were able to overcome this to some degree with USAID, this was a roadblock for DFID leading us to drop this index from our analysis. Furthermore, the data set and methodology for Fund for Peace are not publically available. This hindered our ability to make meaningful comparisons. While confidentiality of information is surely a limitation, it appears that in some cases this problem will remain unsolvable, particularly with respect to donor countries.

C. ANALYSIS

The analytical undertaking of researching fragility indexes was quite extensive. Particularly,

examining 8 indexes as they relate to roughly 13 criteria led to a wide breadth of work. For the purposes of this work, a discussion of the most interesting points of analysis is found below. For further comparisons, please refer the Index Team's Appendix section which allows for more detailed charts and graphs.

On a purely comparative note, when examining the indicators composing each index, CIFP had the largest number with a total of 83. This was followed by USAID which had 33, and Brookings which had 20. As far as the groupings of the indicators are concerned, USAID and George Mason had the highest number of groupings, with 8. This was followed by CIFP which had a total of 6 groupings. Further comparative information on indicators may be found in the Index Team's Appendix section, specifically the Fragility Matrix.

Center for Global Development (CGD) and Institute for State Effectiveness stand out as being different from the remainder of the indexes, leading to their exclusion from most of this analysis. Particularly their methodologies are mostly theoretical narrative analysis, yielding themes of fragility and functions of the state respectively. CGD lists five themes for development and poverty reduction in poorly performing states. Similarly, ISE lists ten functions of the state, if a state fails at any of these functions, then they are considered to be "failing" or "failed". While these two organizations provide a unique perspective on the issue, they are different in that there is no resulting index produced. This being said, it appears that these two organizations produce stepping stones for further research that might yield a quantitative measure. Further information on CGD and ISE may be found in the Index Team's Appendix section, however it is generally excluded from the bulk of this analysis.

Our initial analysis focused on the definitions of fragility used by each organization, in addition to their underlying assumptions. By examining these two criteria, we gained further insight into the composition and results of each index. Most of the organizations shared key words such as "legitimacy", "effectiveness", "authority" and "fragile institutions". When discussing the underlying assumptions of each organization, interesting observations can be made. For instance, Fund for Peace discusses in their literature how state fragility is in fact a new class of conflict, not an isolated event. This is a unique designation of fragility.

Furthermore, CGD assumes that aid dollars and interventions are most effective in strong institutional and policy settings, a view that is shared particularly by the World Bank evident in the fact that their resource allocation is based on an assessment of institutions and policies in the form of a fragility index (this process is discussed in further detail below). Interestingly, CIFP's basic assumption that violent conflict was a central focus of fragility switched to their ALC framework- Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity. This new set of assumptions that ALC components will have an impact on overall fragility is one that guides their thorough indexing analysis. Lastly, in reading the Fragile States Strategy of USAID, it was assumed that the decline of a fragile state can in fact be reversed with the right policies to the point of progressive transformational development. This is indeed a very positive outlook that illustrates the extent to which the USAID index is meant to guide US foreign policy in order to help with these policy transformations.

Through interviews and desk research we were able to learn more about the intended users and purpose of the indexes as well as to what extent these indexes were influenced by a US focus on fragile states to combat an increasing global threat of terrorism. Most of the organizations examined are meant to produce sound, unbiased research to inform these policies. Some of these

indexes are more grounded in academia (such as Brookings and CIFP), while others are more practically oriented, meant to fulfill a particular purpose. Obviously, the data produced by USAID is meant to influence US foreign policy while also creating a meaningful framework for analysis for fragile states, although most of this information is confidential and not publicly available.

One of the indexes whose purpose was practically oriented around its own needs was that of the World Bank, who considers for their index only countries which are eligible for their funding. Specifically, the resource allocation of the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) depends on this indexing analysis. Specifically, what is called the CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) which is essentially the methodology used by the Bank to make its calculations, came to be referred to as the IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) once the Bank began publicly disclosing this information.

Therefore, the CPIA/IRAI is essentially the methodological calculations of the index based on the indicators outlined by the Bank, and in fact this IRAI is published by the Bank but the calculation used for IDA resource allocation is not. The IRAI in addition to past portfolio performance compose the IDA Country Performance Rating (CPR) which is the basis for the Bank's lending practices. It is this focus in lending that explains the overall emphasis on economic/financial components in the indicators. For instance, the Bank does not only have an "Economic Management" grouping of indicators which encompass macroeconomic management, fiscal policy and debt policy, but also a "Structural Policies" grouping to address issues of trade, the financial sector, and the business regulatory environment. Even what could be considered the governance grouping of this index "Public Sector Management and Institutions", encompasses more economic/financial regulatory indicators- for instance quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization and transparency accountability. Social issues for the bank encompass one category, in other indexes this might have been a greater point of focus. Notably a "security" component is missing from the groupings of indicators, something that other indexes emphasize. "Security" as a grouping is used by a number of the indexes examined.

The Brookings Institute includes human rights issues in its security grouping in addition to territorial conflict. George Mason and USAID include security as well as a grouping of indicators, and emphasize it further in their written works which is most likely reflects a more US-centric approach. In other words, the new focus on fragile states by the US government following 9/11 closely tied the issue of fragility with that of possible terrorist threats, thus justifying a greater focus on issues of security (and governance). Interestingly enough, CIFP has a category of "Security & Crime", the only one which measured acts of terrorism as an indicator. We can speculate that this was excluded by other organizations because of the lack of a uniform definition of terrorism, perhaps including too much bias in the index.

Another interesting observation made on the basis of indicators is that CIFP was the only organization to include a category of "Environment". This illustrates the implications of environmental degradation on state fragility, an emerging area of interest. No other organization had a category for environment, however, the World Bank included an indicator of "Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability". Due to the overwhelming economic focus of the Bank, the inclusion of this indicator implies that they see a close connection with environmental sustainability and economic stability.

Overall, the most obvious similarities appeared to be between USAID and George Mason University. Particularly, both organizations divide their indicators into two overarching groups, effectiveness and legitimacy, then further divide them by security, social, political and economic. We are informed through George Mason's Global Report 2008 that the idea of using a matrix of effectiveness and legitimacy as a method for assessing state fragility was developed at the University of Maryland's IRIS center in response to a research request by USAID. The idea was then further developed by people from IRIS and USAID, with the George Mason work being informed by this but also independently developed.¹ While both indexes use the same groupings, USAID utilizes a significantly larger number of indicators used, 33 in total compared to George Mason's 8.²

Another point of analysis is the extent to which these indexes are in fact quantitatively rigorous. We stated previously that one of the overarching reasons for performing this analysis was to consider quantitative analysis such as indexing versus qualitative analysis like country assessments (addressed in the second part of this paper). However, upon closer inspection we find that the "quantitative rigor" that might be implied by many, upon inspection of these lengthy indexes is mostly qualitative coding based on scales. For instance, George Mason University assigns a score of 0-3 (lowest to highest) for each of its indicators, these component scores are then added to create an overall index. This is also the case for at least some indicators in most of the indexes considered. This rating is usually done by experts, but can also be based on specific criteria such as in the case of George Mason which has calculations for each indicator that are then summarized by a rating of 0-3 to compose the overall score. Of course the introduction of assignment of ratings by experts introduces the possibility of biases, a subject that does not seem to be addressed in the publicly disclosed literature available on the organizations examined. Furthermore, another potential source of bias would be the "weights" assigned to each indicator, thus prioritizing them. It is unclear from the literature surveyed what the criteria is for determining weights besides that these too were "expertly" assigned. Interestingly enough, this exact point is addressed by the Brookings Institution. Brookings calculates their index by creating four "baskets" of indicators which are scored, and then standardized and aggregated. These basket scores are then averaged to obtain an overall score for state weakness. However, there is no weighting of indicators because Brookings points out that there is no widely accepted formula to assess with certainty the relative contribution of each indicator to state weakness, and therefore any weighting system would be open to criticisms of inaccuracy and based on the biases of the research experts.

The issue of disclosure was also one that surprisingly became a point of analysis for our team. In particular, USAID does not fully disclose their methodologies and index to the public. While USAID most likely lacks full disclosure because of the political implications, organizations such as Fund for Peace disclose their index however they do not disclose the methodology of their proprietary CAST software nor do they disclose their raw data. This posits a particular problem

¹ Global Report 2008, George Mason University, Winter 2008, p. 12-13.

² There are an additional three indicators noted by George Mason which are NOT calculated into the index. Instead these are meant to illustrate additional information. These indicators are: Regional Effects, Armed Conflict Indicator, and Trajectory. Because these are not included in the index calculation, they are excluded from this portion of the analysis.

when attempting to draw meaningful comparisons in terms of methodology. Furthermore, it decreases the validity of the index since it is not open to scrutiny. Lastly, up until recently, the World Bank did not fully disclose their indexes, or intermediate versions of them. As of 2005, the Bank has been disclosing this information which has allowed for a more robust analysis of their methods and findings.

D. FINDINGS

Based on the above analysis, we are able to focus on a few central findings touched on above but stated explicitly below.

Indicators/Groupings

- CIFP (83) had the largest number of Indicators followed by USAID (33) and Brookings (20). USAID and George Mason had the highest number of groupings (8) followed by CIFP (6).
- The choice of indicators, as well as their groupings, informed the conceptual frameworks and goals of the organizations in producing the index.
- USAID and George Mason both shared their division of indicators into two overarching groups, effectiveness and legitimacy, and then further into four areas of political, social, economic, and security. However, USAID had significantly more indicators (33) than George Mason (8).
- CGD and ISE do not use indicators for their analysis, therefore these organizations were largely excluded from this analysis (although it appears that their work thus far is going to be the framework for a more robust analysis).

Methodologies

- CIFP seems to have the most comprehensive methodology utilizing scenario planning, multivariate analysis, event monitoring etc.
- While these indexes appear to be quantitative in nature, upon closer examination we found that many of the quantitative measures were in fact scales for which the scores were assigned by experts. We felt that this possibly introduces bias, as mentioned in the Brookings literature.
- Many of these index components are "weighted", thus creating a greater possibility for biased results.
- Therefore, while these indexes are quantitative, this analysis shows that there is still a qualitative component and we question how much more rigorous this analysis is versus a purely qualitative analysis.

Additional Findings

- Through an interview, we learned that Brookings' work was meant to be one part of a multi-step analysis. This is interesting because the overall robustness of Brookings leads to curiosity on what would be the next steps in that project.
- The intended uses/users of the index affected its composition. For instance, the case of the World Bank is the most obvious since their index is used for lending practices and it focuses predominantly on economics/finance.
- Most indexes are meant to be used as a tool by policy-makers and were created to inform policy resulting from increased US focus on state fragility.
- Relationships between indexes are extensive and obvious (particularly based on their literature reviews and our interviews). However, mapping these relationships is difficult and would likely necessitate further in depth interviews.
- The data sources used by most organizations are the same (UN, World Bank etc.), however their interpretation and how they are assigned ratings varies
- The fact that Fund for Peace does not disclose their methodology (based on their proprietary CAST software) or their raw data, greatly inhibits the ability for us to perform an in-depth comparative analysis. Furthermore, this lack of disclosure decreases our faith in the validity of this index.
- The top 15 most fragile states for these organizations are largely similar, with an occasional outlier such as the West Bank and Gaza in the case of CIFP and Myanmar in the case of George Mason.
- It is important to recognize that because each organization is defining "fragility" and "state weakness" differently, based on factors that it recognizes and classifies, the indexes are not necessarily comparable. In other words, just because indicators have the same name across different indexes, it does not necessarily mean they are measuring the same thing.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The analysis and findings above lend themselves to a brief outline of suggested next steps for future research.

- Facilitate further in-depth interviews with those involved with the creation of these indexes, particularly to gauge how closely related index conceptualizes and methods are with one another.
- Follow up on the preliminary set of indexes examined to determine if any progress has been made.
- Determine the extent to which the development agenda and the security agenda is merging through a further analysis of the literature of these organizations.
- Highlight the differences between security oriented indexes and development/relief oriented indexes.
- Map out the human capital behind these projects. Who has worked on which index, for how long and to which organization do they work for now?
- Survey consumers of index data to better understand how they are perceived and utilized by users.

PART II. CONFLICT ASSESSMENT CASE STUDIES

The second half of our project explores conflict assessment tools that focus on a more in-depth and qualitative understanding of specific countries. A number of donor countries are incorporating conflict assessment tools into their aid process, using them to help augment program development and make funding decisions. These assessments focus on historical and contemporary issues underlying conflict. Unlike country rankings that rely on quantitative indexes, these assessments are largely qualitative in nature. They are presented in narrative form and designed to imbibe practitioners with a more in-depth understanding of the various dynamic social issues that contribute to state fragility. Their utility and design differ from the indexes studies above, yet they similarly aim to provide programmers and policy makers with a greater understanding of state fragility. While the indexes and comparative country rankings examined may be useful for headquarter offices, their utility on the level of field work is questionable. Similarly, in-depth qualitative assessments may not be utilized by headquarter officials dealing with funding decisions on a variety of countries or regions. Though these methods of assessment are complimentary in purpose, the data and structure utilized by each can result in a disparate understanding of how fragile a state is and why. In this section, we examine how these country specific analysis are prepared and how they shape programming.

A. METHODOLOGY

Donors are aware that a clear-eyed understanding of the underlying political dynamics in fragile states can enhance their country strategy and programming by elucidating the often intangible factors and relationships that drive political behavior. As international donors recognize that there is no one-size-fits-all approach, they invest much energy in adapting their responses with attention paid to local political realities. In this section, we first analyze conflict assessments done by donor governments. In focusing on Burundi and Sri Lanka, we sought to better understand: i) how the donor defines the core issues of the conflict; ii) how the donor analyzes the conflict; iii) how the donor sees the conflict can be resolved; iv) the focus of their funding / efforts in the country; and v) how the conflict assessments actually translate into donor programming in the case of Burundi. We subsequently conducted interviews with staff involved in the Burundi assessment processes to ascertain how conflict assessments are used on the ground and whether the assessments' recommendations are successfully incorporated into the donor government's strategic goals. After analyzing the accomplishments, shortcomings and challenges of the assessment process we provide recommendations on how donors can augment the assessment processes for more valuable results. We begin our analysis with a comparative review of assessments on Sri Lanka.

B. SRI LANKA

Despite Sri Lanka's continuous state of conflict since 1983, most donors historically provided aid to the state in a "conflict blind" or "working-around-conflict" manner that tended to follow the fracture lines of the conflict. Most current aid programs focus on macro-economic reform, expansion of the private sector, state reform, infrastructure, and poverty alleviation. In this section, we examined five conflict assessment reports issued by key donors:

EC Conflict Assessment Mission: Sri Lanka 2002. By Dr Rienzie Perera and Morgan MacSwiney. Funded by the European Commission.

USAID: Economic Growth and Conflict Assessment 2006. By Judith Dunbar (USAID) and Bruce Bolnick (Nathan Associates Inc.)

Conflict Assessments: Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka. By Jonathan Goodhand, funded by DIFD, 2001.

Managing Group Grievances and Internal Conflict: Sri Lanka Country Report 2003 Produced by the Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Aid Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka 2000-2005. By Jonathan Goodhand and Bart Klem. Funded by the governments of the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom in collaboration with the Asia Foundation and the World Bank.

i) The European Commission

The European Commission (EC) assessment provides a general political analysis of the conflict, prescribing the support and strengthening of the ceasefire agreement – through the state – as the key to peace in Sri Lanka. The EC view is that the deep divisions and lack of coordination/consensus within the donor and civil society communities are hindering Sri Lanka's road to peace. The assessment suggests that peace in Sri Lanka will only be possible with the equal and integral participation of ethnic and religious groups in the government. The EC analyzes peace negotiation efforts, key actors and institutions, and their interests. The EC also identifies each actor's potential to contribute to the peace process. However, the EC centers peace in Sri Lanka around the ceasefire agreement and does not adequately address other key issues that contribute to instability, including root causes of the conflict, group and regional grievances. The EC supports programs that are most conducive to strengthening the ceasefire agreement.

ii) USAID

USAID also sees the conflict as fundamentally political and driven by inequality grievances from the warring parties. USAID's programs aim to build social and economic capital in order to create adequate breathing space for a viable political solution. Its programs rely heavily on various assessment tools, including transparency international's corruption index, the World Bank's "Doing Business" report, and Fund for Peace's "Conflict Assessment System Tool." USAID's prescription for peace focuses on developing the private sector and providing economic opportunities to the people. The report identifies various tools to meet the immediate economic needs of Sri Lankans. The report, however, does not address how a political solution can be achieved and does not comprehensively address other key issues relevant to the conflict. Economic programs and the private sector in Sri Lanka cannot be sustainable without a clear

political solution and adequate stability in the country. USAID funding focuses on security programs as well as economic development programs. USAID also has a joint program with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) addressing the transfer of refugee/IDP-related issues from DoD to USAID.

iii) 2001 DFID Conflict Assessment Report

The DFID conflict assessment report provides an effective mapping of aid in Sri Lanka, analyzing in-depth the donor dynamics in the country to better understand the links between development, poverty and conflict in the context of ongoing violence. The report also provides a historical analysis of the conflict and key actors. It provides a useful analysis of the donor dynamics in the country and categorizes donor approaches in providing aid to Sri Lanka as – a) working around conflict; b) working in conflict; or c) working on conflict. The report finds that most donors in Sri Lanka work around the conflict. DFID also provides an in-depth analysis of challenges faced by donor aid organizations / governments. It highlights some of the efforts donors have adopted to improve coordination and harmonization. It does not explain, however, what factors contributed to the donor community’s failure to coordinate effectively. We were not able to find public information on what type of specific programs DFID funds in Sri Lanka.

iv) 2003 Clingendael Institute Report (Dutch Government)

The Clingendael Institute report provides a very robust analysis of the conflict, with a diagnostic assessment of conflict course and parameters as well as a historical analysis of the motives of the warring groups. It also provides a comprehensive examination of the root causes and sources of conflict. Sri Lanka is part of a test project with three other countries – Mozambique, Ghana and Nicaragua – where Clingendael Institute is trying to gain a better understanding of conflict / development by comparing each cases based on 13 factors.³ assessment provides a very comprehensive qualitative analysis of the conflict situation in Sri Lanka, however, the 13 standardized factors identified may not be as central to Sri Lanka as to the other countries involved in the project. Though the report analyzes the case of Sri Lanka it lacks recommendations for improvement. Nevertheless, despite its length it is a great resource for policymakers. The report does not provide information on which areas of programming Dutch government flows to.

v) 2005 Joint Strategic Conflict Assessment (UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Asia Foundation, and World Bank)

The Joint Strategic Conflict Assessment builds on the 2001 DFID assessment. It examines the Sri Lankan conflict in the “crisis of the state” context. The report identifies the situation as a

³The 13 assessment factors include: 1) Level of general economic development or deterioration; 2) Resource base and the structure of the economy; 3) Population distribution; 4) Society’s cohesion or division; 5) History of inter-group violent conflict/cooperation; 6) Distribution of economic and social goods; 7) Group political mobilization, organization and strategies; 8) Openness of the formal political and governing institutions; 9) Exclusive or accommodative governing institutions and decision-making process; 10) Group participation in non-official and informal processes and institution; 11) Efficacy of political elites and leaders; 12) Efficacy of security forces and violations of human rights; and 13) International engagement.

“pause in conflict,” and the focus is on managing the ceasefire rather than advancing the peace process. It looks at the internationalization of peace-building and donors’ efforts to strive for “strategic complementarity.” It examines conflict structures and provides an in-depth analysis of conflict dynamics by examining changes in party politics and donor strategies. It analyzes the current approach and finds that donor harmonization is lacking. The report criticizes donors’ approaches in Sri Lanka without considering the political realities affecting their decisions. The assessment should be more conscientious of donor politics in order to provide effective recommendations on how to overcome the political challenges that hinder harmonization.

C. BURUNDI

For the Burundi case study analysis we examined the following three assessments:

USAID: Identifying Patterns of Fragility and Resilience, 2005

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Burundi Stability Assessment, 2006. Clingendael Institute with Forum on Early Warning and Early Response- Africa

Power and Change Analysis Burundi Produced for the Government of the Netherlands by ECORYS Nederland BV

Notes on Assessment Structure and Approach

The varied approaches taken to conflict assessment and state fragility are reflected in assessment structure and invariably influence each organization's respective findings. The three assessments examined provide interesting insight into the effects of basic structuring as their approaches to assessment are quite varied. The USAID assessments served as background papers for the *USAID Burundi Workshop 2005: Identifying Patterns of Fragility and Resilience*. This conference was designed to feed into a more formal conflict assessment that did not materialize. However, the background papers provide unique insight into the USAID approach to conflict and fragility assessment in Burundi. The background assessment consists of a series of 6 papers on fragility in Burundi, each prepared independently by experts in the field. This design results in the least consistent analysis of state fragility, yet provides comparatively heterogeneous perspectives on fragility in Burundi, reflecting each expert's understanding of the roots of conflict.

Also examined were two complimentary assessments commissioned by the Royal Netherlands Government: 1) *Burundi Stability Assessment 2006* produced by the Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute with the Forum of Early Warning and Early Response-Africa and 2) *Power and Change Analysis Burundi* produced by ECORYS Nederland BV

The Clingendael Institute *Burundi Stability Assessment 2006* presents a highly coherent analysis. Based on both quantitative and qualitative data the Clingendael Institute team applies a consistently structured framework to measure state fragility across a series of indicators from 1993 to 2006. Each category of indicators is ranked yearly on a scale of one to ten, *stable* to *alert*, allowing readers to assess recent trends in the dynamics of Burundian society. This approach results in the most straightforward and accessible formatting of the three assessments. However, the method of using expert analysis to translate qualitative events into quantitative rankings risks reducing complex social and political events to simplistic numerical trends that may not adequately reflect the multifaceted and dynamic realities underlying conflict and social change in Burundi.

The ECORYS' *Power and Change Analysis Burundi 2008* does not attempt to quantify social trends but identifies and explores a number of key factors all contributing in various degrees to state fragility. This assessment is unique in that it provides a structured historical analysis of the Burundian state, offering insight into the deep roots of conflict and social instability largely lacking in the other assessments.

Understanding of Conflict and Resulting Assessment Recommendations

The USAID sponsored assessment consists of 6 papers, each approaching state fragility from a unique perspective. Theoretical approaches to the causes of fragility include an overall analysis of ‘triggering causes’ and ‘structural causes’ of conflict, an economic analysis, an examination of the security sector, and an analysis on governance. Each of these papers stands alone and provides insight into various perspectives on the root causes of conflict. This leads to a variety of suggestions on how aid should be utilized to support stability. Each author presents practical recommendations in the context of the issues they examined.

The Clingendael Institute assessment takes an integrated approach to understanding conflict and attempts to cluster together and quantify the numerous factors that contribute to state fragility. Three main clusters of factors that contribute to instability are examined in detail, a) political dimensions, b) socioeconomic dimensions, and c) regional dimensions. Of these the Clingendael Institute group identifies political and socioeconomic dimensions as the most volatile, with demographics and land distribution as highly pressing issues.

The assumption that various socio-political aspects of conflict can be measured, translated into numerical values and subsequently compared to discern trends in conflict speaks to a highly scientific approach to understanding political violence. Though useful in providing easily interpretable data it may contribute to an inappropriate confidence in one interpretation of the conflict. This theoretical approach naturally grants more emphasis to immediate social events, specifically those that appear to precede violent outbreaks.

Clingendael Institute findings on the causes of fragility lead them to identify the corresponding key “entry points for international engagement” as security sector reform, support for government and civil society, regional collaboration, economic development assistance, and land reform.

The ECROYS assessment takes a historical and structural approach to understanding instability in Burundi. The roots of contemporary conflict are sought in an examination of the “geographical, economic and social features that fundamentally shape the nature of state and society in Burundi.” Particular attention is paid to the history of state formation and the geostrategic position of Burundi. This historical approach lends itself to a focus on the effects of a socio-political culture shaped by cycles of violence and war. Through this lens formal and informal networks of power and their contribution to fragility in Burundi are examined. It is assumed that conflict is a product not simply of contemporary social issues but the cycles of violence that have permeated the history of Burundi. Though specific immediate factors leading to conflict are examined there is an emphasis on the political culture that has been fashioned by decades of violence.

The ECROYS analysis suggests that the problem of fragility be addressed through a “sequence of support actions” that take into account the motivations of and capacity of relevant actors for carrying out programs. Their long-term and institutionalized understanding of conflict leads the authors to suggest “avoiding unrealistically tight timelines” while helping the state consolidate power and provide meaningful development for citizens.

Reflections in Funding

The Netherlands is currently implementing an area approach to the Great Lakes, highlighting a focus on the regional nature of conflict and development in Burundi. The majority of their aid is channeled towards security sector reform, humanitarian needs, and economic development. The *USAID 2006-2008 Burundi Strategy Statement* identifies areas of key funding to be reinforcing conflict mitigation capacity and enhancing democratic governance. Aid prioritization by both countries reflects the recognition that development, political stability and human security are inextricably intertwined. However, it is difficult to discern the relationship between assessments and funding. While assessments are undertaken in order to shape programming, it should be noted that a variety of political factors are bound to influence donor country funding and programming goals. The structure of the assessments inevitably reflects previously prioritized donor country concerns which could lead to foregone conclusions on programming and spending.

D: Burundi Interview Highlights

To understand whether the link between conflict assessments and programming reaches beyond the rhetorical we conducted a series of interviews with those involved in the Burundi assessments we examined.

The Netherlands in Burundi

Consultant 1: *Royal Netherlands Government: Power and Change Analysis: Burundi*, 2008. ECROYS Research and Consulting

Consultant 2: *Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Burundi Stability Assessment*, 2006. Clingendael Institute with Forum on Early Warning and Early Response- Africa

Assessment Initiation and Reflection in the Field Office - Headquarters Relationship

We had the opportunity to interview two consultants who had worked on the Netherlands-Burundi studies. From our conversations we surmised that the assessment process was designed and implemented in a top down fashion through a larger project initiated at the Hague. However, consultant number one stated that at the conception of the project he was told to envision the embassy rather than the Hague as his primary client. He stated that one participant on the embassy staff noted that had they known how useful the assessment would be more time would have been allotted to the internal assessment workshop. While consultant 1 categorized the response from the embassy as generally enthusiastic, this reading of tensions is somewhat contradictory of the second consultant's perception of the process. Consultant 2 described his experience working with the embassies as mixed, depending largely on whether an ally at the embassy could be made - one willing to pursue and actively implement the assessment's recommendations. Consultant 2 also suggested that the Burundi embassy response, which he surmised to be less than enthusiastic, may have stemmed from a feeling that the assessment process was too theoretical to be useful in on-the-ground planning. Interviewing those involved in Burundian programming at the time would allow for a much deeper understanding of how the assessments were received and how (or if) they were utilized.

Mechanism for Filtering Assessment into Programming

These assessments were designed not to shift program priorities but rather help programmers augment projects and engage in more effective planning. Rather than shaping the choice of which sector to work in, they aimed to assist staff in assuming the most constructive path to their chosen sectors. The Dutch have designed the assessment program with an end workshop period, where the consultants meet with embassy officials and engage them in a dialogue on their completed analysis. It is designed to allow consultants as well as embassy officials to develop a program that is best suited to the actual situation on the ground. This workshop period was designed to take place over a day period but was only allotted a half a day at the Burundian embassy. The structure of the workshop involved beginning with general questions and then narrowing down focus. Eventually, participants should examine opportunities for change and entry points for addressing conflict in programming.

Consultant 1 felt that the weakest link in the process was the lack of a more formal mechanism for filtering these assessments into programming. The extent to which they are utilized in program design and strategy depends on the embassy staff. He stated that implementation depends on "whose desk it lands on" and that having an interested ally in the embassy will make all the difference.

However, he noted that the Hague does use the assessments to gauge programming, and that foreign desks have been asked to resubmit programming budgets for a failure to incorporate assessment findings into design. Though this ensures that the embassy will at least rhetorically incorporate the assessment in programming, it may also place a strain on field office – headquarters’ relationship.

Recommendations

Consultant 1 felt that integration and information sharing among donor agencies was extremely important. He recognized that due to conflicting agendas, collaboration between donor countries would be difficult but not impossible. He cited a formal lunch held during the first phase of the Burundi assessment where a variety of donor country representatives were invited to participate, share their concerns and opinions, and suggest possible areas for assessment focus. The external workshop then served as a platform to share assessment findings with a variety of aid workers practicing in Burundi.

Interview Insights

USAID: Identifying Patterns of Fragility and Resilience, 2005

We had the opportunity to interview a USAID worker who had been present at the examined 2005 Burundi conference and is additionally well versed in the agency’s work on conflict and fragility assessment.

Mechanism for Filtering Assessment into Programming

The interviewee acknowledged that the program lacked a formal tool for filtering assessment findings into programming. This was in her opinion a major problem. She found there was a clear gap between the assessment process and an understanding of how to utilize analysis in programming.

To the interviewee this was symptomatic of a larger problem facing the field of stabilization and development. She stated that though “stabilization and reconstruction planners have adopted the tools of development workers, they have not adapted them.” Incorporating these political assessments into long standing projects that at first appear to have few formal entry points for peace building is difficult. As of now technical planners don’t know how to address the issues in these assessments. They are asked to design and implement traditional development work such as health planning, water and sanitation through the lens of political conflict. Expecting a worker to incorporate conflict assessments into standing development programs is challenging at best.

The interviewee felt that using traditional development tools and frameworks in fragile-state settings is simply not working and a new approach is needed.

Recommendations

The interviewee suggests that an integrated strategy be developed across United States’ agencies working in any one area. Today, agencies often work in parallel but not collaboratively. In order to accomplish this she would like to see an integrated strategy subscribed to by all agencies working in one area. The strategy should be clearly defined with short term, medium and long term goals that each agency could realistically work towards.

E. CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS

Our research provided valuable insight into the current use and design of conflict assessments. Additionally, our work raised a number of questions for future exploration. We found that the proposed goal of the assessment process is clear: to provide an analysis of conflict and fragility that can be used to augment donor country programming. Problematically, this assumes that once practitioners possess a clear understanding of political conflict it will be reflected in programming. The assessments reviewed fulfilled the goal of providing succinct analysis of conflict and its underlying causes, in so far as this is possible in a length and format that is easily accessible for decision-makers. However, the flaw in the assessment process stems from the fact that providing clear and concise analysis of a conflict is not enough to effectively shape programming. There appears to be little conception of what 'conflict sensitive' development programming would look like and how it should be achieved. Those interviewed expressed frustration with the lack of a parallel tool to guide the analysis provided by assessments into programming. Future research should explore the experiences of practitioners in fragile states, the lessons they have garnered on conflict sensitive development methods and the utility of assessments.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS

Through our analysis of conflict assessments and our understanding of the challenges that donor governments face in incorporating assessments into country programming, we provide the following recommendations:

Recommendation No. 1: Improve mechanisms of oversight - headquarters to local embassy

There appears to be a disconnect between the goals of headquarters and the level of commitment in the local embassies. To ensure that conflict assessments are incorporated in the country strategic goals, it would be useful for headquarters to set up a mechanism of oversight where local embassies would report back to headquarters explaining how assessments were used on the ground. If they were not used, then the embassy should provide an explanation on the reasons, i.e. why the assessment may not have been applicable in the current context.

Recommendation No. 2: Improve dialogue between headquarters and local embassy

To ensure that the headquarters' goals are properly explained to the local office and that the local office is committed to implementing findings from the assessments, there needs to be greater consultation prior to and after the conflict assessment implementation. This would ensure that the assessment designers understand the complexities on the ground and examine ideas from the embassy as they proceed with the report. Once the report is completed, consultants should meet with the embassies to deliver the results and discuss them with embassy officials. Also, this could contribute to improving or enhancing headquarters-local office relationships.

Recommendation No. 3: Improve timing coordination

Ensure that assessments are provided to the local office prior to the development of country strategic goals and that aid experts are included in the country meeting. The assessments also need to be provided to the local embassy prior to the finalization of country strategic goals. This would ensure that relevant findings from the report are taken into account as the embassy (or headquarters) develop goals.

Recommendation No. 4: Provide training

Although some governments conduct consultation between headquarters' consultants/ employees and embassy staff, it would be productive to formalize training programs for embassy officials. The training programs would educate embassy officials on why and how to incorporate a better understanding of conflict into development and how conflict assessments can be used on the ground. A deeper knowledge of the potential utility of conflict assessment reports may ensure the commitment of embassy officials.

Recommendation No. 5: Make Conflict Assessments Required Reading for Local Office

Prior to coming into a country, foreign government officials are often given a set of background readings on the specific country. Conflict assessment reports should be included in this packet to ensure that all government officials are aware of existing analyses of conflict dynamics and what can be done.

Recommendation No. 6: Develop a Country-Specific Assessment of Previous Strategic Failures

It would be constructive to analyze what programs were adopted in the past and why they failed - this type of analysis would provide a set of lessons learned for practitioners on the ground and ensure that similar errors are not committed moving forward.

Recommendation No. 7: Create formal tool to filter conflict assessments into programming

Donor governments are encouraged to develop a formal tool to helping policy-makers incorporate conflict assessments into programming. This could be a checklist or a grid providing suggestions on how to translate specific recommendations into programming.

PART IV. INTEGRATED PROJECT CONCLUSION

Our collective examination of quantitative indexes and case study analysis of country-specific qualitative fragility assessments lead to numerous insights into the conflict and fragility assessment process.

Interestingly we found that both the quantitative index based rankings and the qualitative country reports highlighted one another's strengths and weaknesses. The examined case study assessments of Burundi and Sri Lanka presented qualitative socioeconomic and political analysis, most often in the form of historical and social narrative.

However, the desire for hard quantitative data was evident in the Clingendael Institute approach of assigning numerical values to 'expert analysis'. Similarly, the desire to present accessible quantitative and comparative analysis to decision makers is highlighted through the structure of the indexes. Though country rankings produced by the various examined institutions are useful to differentiate between fragile and stable states in broad terms, their applicability in programming appears limited.

This division between qualitative and quantitative analysis speaks to a larger issue confronting donor countries in fragile state environments: the inherent difficulty in understanding and translating the complex and dynamic social issues that underlie conflict into a condensed narrative and subsequently utilizing this narrative to develop humanitarian and development programming.

As background material for decision makers, the examined analysis can provide easily accessible material, however, they are often packaged and marketed as diluted "sound bytes" that do not thoroughly capture or reflect the nuances and complexities on the ground.

Appendix VI: Bibliographic Sources (Country Assessments)

Case Studies for Comparative Analysis

Sri Lanka:

Managing Group Grievances and Internal Conflict: Sri Lanka Country Report 2003 Produced by the Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

USAID: Economic Growth and Conflict Assessment 2006. By Judith Dunbar (USAID) and Bruce Bolnick (Nathan Associates Inc.)

Conflict Assessments: Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka. By Jonathan Goodhand funded by DIFD date?

Aid Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka 2000-2005. By Jonathan Goodhand and Bart Klem. Funded by the governments of the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom in collaboration with the Asia Foundation and the World Bank.

EC Conflict Assessment Mission: Sri Lanka 2002. By Dr Rienzie Perera and Morgan MacSwiney. Funded by the European Commission.

Burundi:

Identifying Patterns of Fragility and Resilience 2005 USAID

Burundi Stability Assessment 2006 Produced for the Royal Netherlands Government by Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute With the Forum of Early Warning and Early Response-Africa for the Netherlands

Power and Change Analysis Burundi Produced for the Government of the Netherlands by ECORYS Nederland BV

Appendix 2: Suggestions for SIPA to Improve Capstone Workshops:

SIPA:

- (1) SIPA should provide strict substantive and technical guidelines for potential clients so that projects provide enough work for a five person team.
- (2) SIPA should have a capstone orientation for all the capstone groups at the beginning of the semester to discuss the SIPA requirements and the capstone fair.
- (3) SIPA should review projects and assure they are related to organizational priorities and not part of a small project that may be marginalized.
- (4) SIPA should select projects that directly contribute to the organizational work.
- (5) SIPA should provide clear instructions and not vague templates.
- (6) PCP's should be flexible and fluid - a "working document" throughout the semester.
- (7) Capstone courses should be scheduled at the beginning of the week, on a Monday or Tuesday, to better correspond with the business work week of the client.
- (8) Make conference rooms, conference phones available for Capstone purposes.
- (9) Provide small budgets per capstone for "hosting" of client for mid-term briefings or final reporting.

Team:

- (1) Attempt to include students from different concentrations so that the project benefits from interdisciplinary perspectives.
- (2) Map out student coursework and previous experience to assure diversity of background in group.

Facilitator:

- (1) SIPA should clarify whether the role of the Facilitator (Faculty Member) is a substantive and functional one or a process driven one or both?

Client:

- (1) Client needs and expectations should be defined before the semester begins and not be evolving throughout the course.
- (2) Should provide feedback sooner in the semester for the final briefing.
- (3) Please make the objectives and the requirements clearer for the PCP. This assignment was unclear and was not flexible enough to be integrated with our specific type of workshop.

Deliverables:

- (1) Deliverables, including SIPA expectations should be tailored by project as there is no one format that fits all types of projects.
- (2) Deadlines should remain fluid based on project development and client feedback.

Capstone Fair:

- (1) Should be advertised to the entire SIPA student body so that those interested in projects/organizations can come learn about them.
- (2) Refreshments were great.
- (3) The capstone fair presentations were so short that it was difficult for groups to convey any meaningful insight into their projects. Perhaps in the future, in addition to the short presentations, create a web page allowing for video presentations slightly longer (5-10 minutes) to be uploaded and made available for viewing.

APPENDIX I: Indexes Team - General Interview Script Questions

Questions that relate to conceptual background underpinning Index:

- (1) What conceptual framework guided the need for and development of this Index?
- (2) Why this particular framework and not other ones which are often referred to and cited in the state fragility and weakness discourse and discussion?
- (3) Are there any gaps you are aware of that make utilizing this framework over another disadvantageous?

Questions that relate to relationships to other Indexes:

- (1) In developing and fine-tuning this Index, did you partner with or consult other Institutes or donors involved in similar work?
- (2) Was that process helpful in shaping this Index? How so?
- (3) Does that relationship continue as you observe the influence the Index is having on policymaking and programming decision-making?

Questions that relate to Index design and formulation:

- (1) What gap were you envisioning the Index would fill, in other words what is the usefulness of creating this Index?
- (2) Do you feel that the Index conceptual background and design meet the objectives you had in mind? What were some of those objectives?

Questions that relate to target audience and general demand:

- (1) Who are the users or the target audience of the Index output?
- (2) Is that the audience you initially had in mind when designing it?
- (3) Did you envision the Index as a "stand-alone" tool or instrument or do you see it accompanying other tools, perhaps part of ongoing development of an institutional tool box guiding action towards fragile states?

Questions that relate to Index output and relationship with policymakers programming and donor decision-making:

- (1) How have you seen the impact of the Index play out? Has it affected donor investment in countries, private sector investment in countries?
- (2) Do you feel the Index has influenced the debate surrounding state weakness and fragility? How has it contributed to shaping this debate? Perhaps retracted?
- (3) Did this Index fulfill a specific government demand or need?
- (4) Where does funding for this Index originate? Has that influenced the underlying motivation and purpose of the project?
- (5) What specific policy prescriptions have followed from information captured by this particular Index?

APPENDIX II: Top 15 Fragile States – Comparison

	Brookings	Fund for Peace	George Mason	CIFP	World Bank (IRAI)	World Bank (CPR)
1	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Sudan	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe
2	Afghanistan	Sudan	Sudan	Afghanistan	Comoros	Togo
3	DRC	Zimbabwe	Afghanistan	DRC	Eritrea	Sudan
4	Iraq	Chad	Myanmar	Somalia	Afghanistan & CAR	Afghanistan
5	Burundi	Iraq	Chad	Ethiopia	Sudan	Chad
6	Sudan	DRC	DRC	Iraq	Togo	Comoros
7	CAR	Afghanistan	Iraq	Burundi	Cote d'Ivoire	CAR
8	Zimbabwe	Cote d'Ivoire	Rwanda	Haiti	Chad	DRC
9	Liberia	Pakistan	Burundi	Pakistan	Guinea-Bissau	Cote d'Ivoire
10	Cote D'Ivoire	CAR	Liberia	Liberia	DRC	Haiti
11	Angola	Guinea	Nigeria	West Bank and Gaza	Timor-Leste	Angola
12	Haiti	Bangladesh	Sierra Leone	Eritrea	Angola & Solomon Islands	Eritrea
13	Sierra Leone	Burma	CAR	Cote d'Ivoire	Republic of Congo	Timor-Leste
14	Eritrea	Haiti	Ethiopia	Nepal	Haiti	Guinea-Bissau
15	North Korea	North Korea	Guinea	Nigeria	Sao Tome & Principe	Solomon Islands

Note: Adjustments have been made for some of those states who tied for a particular slot, specifically for World Bank Indexes. This Comparison mostly offers a general visual breakdown and for specific details please consult with individual Index reports.

APPENDIX III:
Bibliographic Sources (Index Analysis)

Center for Global Development (CGD): <http://www.cgdev.org>

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP): <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/>

Gani, Ashraf and Lockhart, Clare. "Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World." Oxford University Press, USA (2 May 2008).

Jones Bruce, Chandran Rahul, Cousens Elizabeth, Slotin Jenna and Sherman Jake. "From Fragility to Resilience: Concepts and Dilemmas of Statebuilding in Fragile States." A Research Paper for the OECD Fragile States Group by the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and International Peace Academy (4 March 2008).

International Development Association, Performance Ratings 2008. A Project of the World Bank. Accessed March 2009. World Bank Homepage. Worldbank.org

- Country Policy and Institutional Assessments 2007
- Assessment Questionnaire
- Operations Policy and Country Services, World Bank, December 19th 2007

Measuring State Fragility, Indicators and Methods for Rating State Performance USAID, 2005.

Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole. Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2008 *Foreign Policy Bulletin: The Documentary Record of United States Foreign Policy* , Volume 18, Issue 01, December 2008, pp 3-21

Susan E. Rice, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development Stewart Patrick, Research Fellow, Center for Global Development.

- Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
- The Brookings Institution (2008)

Brookings	Fund for Peace	George Mason	Center for Global Development (CGD)	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFF)	Inst. for State Effectiveness	World Bank	USAID
NAME OF INDEX							
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World	Failed State Index	State Fragility Index	Engaging Fragile States Initiative	The Failed and Fragile States Project	Sovereignty Index	IDA Country Performance Rating (CPR)	State Fragility
YEAR OF CREATION							
2008	2005	2007				(years are of disclosure, it is unknown how many years these have been conducted) IRAI: 2005, 2006, 2007. CPR: 2007	Most recent is 2008, frequency of publication is unknown
FRAGILITY INDEX - MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY							
2008	2005-2008	2007, 2008				Unknown, publically disclosed in 2006	Perhaps in 2005 since this is when the strategy paper was revealed, but unknown
DEFINITION OF FRAGILITY							
<p>Fragility is a way to determine which countries who are in some way, or in total, weak. Weak states are unable or unwilling to provide essential public services, which include fostering equitable and sustainable economic growth, governing legitimately, ensuring physical security, and delivering basic services.</p>	<p>A state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. The 12 indicators cover a wide range of state failure risk elements such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary displacement of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay. States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over different time periods.</p>	<p>Fragility is determined by state effectiveness and legitimacy. If both are absent then a state is failed. If fragility is not definitely defined but instead is explained through two qualities of state performance: effectiveness and legitimacy. Within each of these qualities, familiar terms like "economic effectiveness" are found but in this matrix, but this report uses careful degrees of measurement rather than a textbook definition.</p>	N/A	<p>Fragile States: Lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens and interests.</p> <p>Weak States: Are susceptible to fragility or failure because of limited governance capacity, economic stagnation, and/or an inability to ensure the security of their borders and sovereign domestic territory.</p> <p>Failing States: Exhibit key elements of fragility, and are experiencing organized political violence. Peace processes are weak or non-existent.</p> <p>Failed States: States characterized by conflict, humanitarian crises, and economic collapse. Government authority, legitimacy, and capacity no longer extend throughout the state, but instead are limited either to specific regions or groups.</p>	<p>Collapsed states are those that are unable to provide their citizens with services. These states fail to maintain order and have a major sovereignty gap - and can't fulfill obligations to the international community and to their public. Failed states are a major security concern to the global community as they foster crime, humanitarian crises, mass poverty and have a general lack of infrastructure and law enforcement institutions.</p>	<p>Fragile states are not always conflict-affected and conflict-affected countries are not necessarily hampered by fragile institutions - but there are important commonalities, as many fragile states are affected by conflict and many conflict-affected countries are plagued by weak institutions and low capacity. From an operational perspective it is therefore most valuable to approach the two agendas in an integrated and coherent manner, which is best served by combining the perspectives of the World Bank's historical work on both fragile and conflict-affected countries, pooling institutional learning on conflict prevention and reconstruction to enhance and inform the links between the peace building, state building and governance agendas.</p>	<p>USAID uses the term fragile states to refer generally to a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states. The strategy distinguishes between fragile states that are VULNERABLE from those that are already in CRISIS. VULNERABLE refers to those states unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question (This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis). CRISIS is used to refer to those states where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk.</p>
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS							
<p>There is no widely accepted formula to definitely assess the relative contribution of each area of state weakness, any unequal weighting system would be open to criticism on the grounds that it could not be accurate for all countries and reflect the arbitrary biases of the researchers.</p>	<p>State fragility is a new class of conflict, not isolated events.</p>	<p>Formulas were developed with the assumption that low level wars' residual effects diminish quickly and the residual effects in long term wars diminish gradually over a 25-year period.</p>	<p>Initiative staff assume that aid dollars and aid interventions are most effective in relatively strong institutional and policy settings. The theoretical framework relies on the 2004 report of the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security, "On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security." Further, researchers are presuming that donors see a connection between weak and failing states and are looking to intervene in those areas.</p>	<p>(1) The ALC framework (Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity); (2) A state needs to exhibit three fundamental properties (ALC) and that weaknesses in one or more of these dimensions will have an impact on the overall fragility of a particular country; (3) Had initially focused on violent conflict and recently focused more on issues of authority, legitimacy and capacity as the most important dimensions of stateness and hence of state fragility.</p>	<p>Follow a framework of "the double compact" the first between a state and its citizens and the second between the state and the international community. Assumes "agreement on a categorization of functions of the state, and the need to harness resources to achieve the goal of state-building". Loss of legitimacy is a key factor contributing to the fragility and failure of states. "Some of the markers of the process of loss of legitimacy are: an increase in illegality, informality, and criminality in the economy; ineffective delivery of basic services, such as health, sanitation and education; failure to maintain or expand essential infrastructure; increase in corruption; and appropriation</p>	<p>Assumes that fragility is measured according to two dimensions: per-capita income below \$1025 per year, and poor performance on the Bank's scorecard for policies and institutions. Highly centered around good-governance.</p>	<p>There is an underlying assumption here that fragile state decline can be reversed with the right policies, and their recovery can be advanced to the point of transformational development progress.</p>

Brookings	Fund for Peace	George Mason	Center for Global Development (CGD)	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)	Inst. for State Effectiveness	World Bank	USAID
PURPOSE OF ANALYSIS							
This report is not only a tool for policymakers to build better strategies and programs aiming to strengthen states, but it is a detailed exploration of how to assess state fragility.	This a tool for policymakers to better monitor state fragility but it is also a call for policymakers to be more aware and require diligent systems for long-term monitoring.	This report seems to be a tool to be used by policymakers and to inform the overall academic discourse on the issue of fragility.	The central goal of the Initiative is to improve the effectiveness of foreign assistance in countries that represent difficult, long-term development challenges. The CGD analysis is meant to educate donors on the best strategy of aid investment.	The purpose of the Assessment is "to provide an overall picture of a country's fragility and trend lines".	The analysts are attempting to influence the debate on the best way to handle failed states as they perceive the current political and militaristic treatment of failed states as ineffective, outdated and counterproductive. They further argue that there is little understanding of failed states, or of the functions of a modern state, given new trends such as globalization and technological development. The authors are concerned that we tend to utilize a "one-size-fits-all" policy without properly analyzing each state and its specific needs.	The Bank states two reasons for undergoing this analysis. The first is that it is a part of their overall effort to reduce poverty and engage countries in being an integral part of their own development. The second reason is that the ratings help determine the relative sizes of the Bank's concessional lending and grants to low-income countries, meaning the lending by the World Bank Group's International Development Association (IDA) on terms with significant grace periods, long repayments periods, and very low interest rates.	The overall purpose of providing assistance to fragile states appears to be to increase global security, particularly US security. (Although there is discussion of improving development efforts etc.) The main purpose for this work appears to be to guide US foreign policy and foreign aid spending
METHODOLOGY							
The Index is based on "baskets" of the 20 indicators- 5 indicators placed in 4 baskets. Within each basket, the indicator scores are standardized and aggregated. The basket scores are then averaged to obtain an overall score for state weakness.	For the Failed States Index, FIP focused solely on the first step, which provides snapshots of state vulnerability or risk of violence during a window in time. The CAST software indexed and scanned hundreds of thousands of open-source articles and reports using Boolean logic. This is accomplished by using a powerful data-collection system that includes international and local media reports and other public documents, including U.S. State Department reports, independent studies, and even corporate financial filings. The data used in each index are collected from May to December of the preceding year. The software indexes and scores the articles based on their meaning relative to the 12 indicators. Internal and external experts then review the scores as well as the	Only independent countries with a total population greater than 500K were considered for this analysis. Each indicator is rated on a four point scale, 0-3. These scores are then added to provide the overall fragility index (as well as the breakdowns of effectiveness and legitimacy separately) - However, the components of EACH indicator scored are done through further methodological technique that are unique to each indicator. (Only conflicts resulting in 500 or more directly related deaths were used for this analysis. The magnitude of the war on the	Comparative theoretical narrative analysis.	(1) Multivariate analysis; (2) Event monitoring data compiled by CIFP researchers over a six month period extending from November 2006 to May 2007. Collected from a variety of web-based sources, including both international and domestic news sources in English and Spanish, the events are quantitatively evaluated and systematically assessed to identify general trends of relevance to state stability and fragility; (3) Analytical exercises, including stakeholder analysis and scenario generation; (4) Inductive Approach to Indexes: structural profile of the country, a composite index that measures overall country performance along six dimensions; (5) Country Event Monitoring is combined with structural approach;	Reframing the debate in terms of a Multifunctional View of the State and the Ten Functions of the state. The methodology is extremely theoretical with a great deal of historical support - but mostly a narrative analysis based on apparent ways the state has evolved throughout history.	"the CPIA, Country Policy and Institutional Assessment is the methodology used, beginning when the Bank started disclosing information, this came to be referred to as the IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI). The IRAI, in addition to past portfolio performance, compose the CPR, which is what is the basis for the Bank's lending practices. The CPIA measures the extent to which a country's policy and institutional framework supports sustainable growth and poverty reduction, and consequently the effective use of development assistance. The output provides an overall score as well as an individual score for each indicator. Ratings are prepared in two ways: "(a) the benchmarking phase, in which a small, representative, sample of countries is rated in an intensive Bankwide process; and (b) a second phase, in which the remaining countries are rated using the derived benchmark ratings as guideposts." Also, for each criterion, countries are rated on a scale of 1-6, keeping in mind a list of what would constitute each number	N/A
NUMBER OF INDICATORS							
20	12	8 (+3 that are not used in the calculation of the overall index score)		83	10 [Note: These are not exactly indicators, but rather functions of the state. If a state does not exhibit these traits/capabilities it is determined to be a failing or failed state]	16	33
NUMBER OF GROUPINGS							
4	3	8	5 themes for development and poverty reduction in poorly performing states.	6		4	8
GROUPINGS							
1. POLITICAL - Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, Voice and Accountability and Freedom 2. SECURITY - Conflict Intensity, Political Stability and Absence of Conflict, Incidence of Coups, Gross Human Rights Abuses, Territory Affected by Conflict 3. ECONOMIC - Gross National Income (GNI) per Capita, Growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Inflation, Income Inequality and Regulatory Quality 4. SOCIAL WELFARE - Child Mortality, Primary School Completion, Undernourishment, Access to Clean Water & Sanitation and Life Expectancy.	1. SOCIAL - Mounting Demographic Pressures, Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia, Chronic and Sustained Human Flight 2. ECONOMIC - Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines, Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline 3. POLITICAL - Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State, Progressive Deterioration of Public Services, Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights, Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State", Rise of Factionalized Elites, Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors.	First, state effectiveness and state legitimacy. Second, social, political, economic and security each have a grouping.		(1) Governance; (2) Economics; (3) Security and crime; (4) Human Development; (5) Demography; (6) Environment	10 Core Functions	1. ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT- Macroeconomic Management, Fiscal Policy, Debt Policy 2. STRUCTURAL POLICIES- Trade, Financial Sector, Business Regulatory Environment. 3. POLICIES FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION/EQUITY- Gender Equality, equity of public resource use, building human resources, social protection and labor, policies and institutions for environmental sustainability. 4. PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONS- Property Rights and Rule-based Governance, Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management, Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization, Quality of Public Administration, Transparency Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector.	The indicators are grouped overall by EFFECTIVENESS and LEGITIMACY, and then are further subdivided by POLITICAL, SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL groupings: POLITICAL/EFFECTIVENESS:1. Quality of public service/ government effectiveness 2. Number of coups d'état in last five yearsThe indicators are grouped overall by EFFECTIVENESS and LEGITIMACY, and then are further subdivided by POLITICAL, SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL groupings: POLITICAL/EFFECTIVENESS:1. Quality of public service/ government effectiveness 2. Number of coups d'état in last five years 3. Government revenues, as percentage of GDP POLITICAL/LEGITIMACY: 4. Nature of political participation (absence or presence of factionalism) 5. % of population experiencing political

Brookings	Fund for Peace	George Mason	Center for Global Development (CGD)	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)	Inst. for State Effectiveness	World Bank	USAID
INDICATORS							
1. GNI per capita	1. Mounting Demographic Pressures	1. social effectiveness: Human Capital Development	(1) The Challenge of Corruption in Fragile States	(1) Governance: As defined by Freedom of the Press, Government Effectiveness, Level of Corruption, Level of Democracy, Level of participation in international political organisations, Percentage of Female Parliamentarians, Permanence of Regime Type, Refugees hosted, Restrictions on Civil Rights, Restrictions on Political Rights, Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability in Decision-making.	(1) Rule of Law	A. Economic Management 1. Macroeconomic Management- assesses the quality of the monetary/exchange rate and aggregate demand policy framework. A high quality policy framework is one that is favorable to sustained medium- term economic growth. Critical components are: a monetary/exchange rate policy with clearly defined price stability objectives; aggregate demand policies that focus on maintaining short and medium-term external balance (under the current and foreseeable external environment); and avoid crowding out private investment	1. Quality of public service/ government effectiveness
2. GDP growth	2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies	2. social legitimacy: Human Capital Care (infant mortality rate)	(2) Managing Natural Resource Wealth: this indicator will discuss the alleged "resource curse" that many developing countries struggle with and build practical knowledge and policy recommendations on how to manage those challenges. "Specifically, CGD will seek to consolidate lessons and recommendations on production and	(2) Economics: As defined by the following parameters: Economic growth - Percentage of GDP, Economic Size - Relative - GDP per capita, Economic Size - Total - GDP, External Debt - percentage of GNI, FDI - percentage of GDP, Foreign Aid - percentage of Central Government Expenditures, Foreign Aid - Total per capita, Inequality - GINI Coefficient, Inflation, Informal	(2) A Monopoly of the Legitimate Means of Violence	2. Fiscal Policy- This criterion assesses the short and medium-term sustainability of fiscal policy (taking into account monetary and exchange rate policy and the sustainability of the public debt) and its impact on growth. This criterion covers the extent to which: (a) the primary balance is managed to ensure sustainability of the public finances; (b) public expenditure/revenue can be adjusted to absorb shocks if necessary; and (c) the provision of public goods, including	2. Number of coups d'état in last five years
3. income inequality	3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia	3. economic effectiveness: GDP per Capita	(3) Fragile States and Transnational Threats: "analyzes whether today's transnational challenges arise disproportionately in weak or poorly governed countries--and whether and how these same forces erode state capacities. The project aims to assist analysts and policymakers in getting greater clarity about which states may be most responsible for which types of threats, and to design development assistance and other forms of external interventions accordingly."	(3) Security and Crime: As defined by the following parameters: Conflict Intensity, Dependence on External Military Support, Human Rights - Empowerment, Human Rights - Physical Integrity, Military Expenditure - percentage of GDP, Political Stability, Refugees Produced, Risk of Ethnic Rebellion, Terrorism - Number of Fatalities, Terrorism - Number of Incidents.	(3) Administrative Control	3. Debt Policy-This criterion assesses whether the debt management strategy is conducive to minimize budgetary risks and ensure long-term debt sustainability. The criterion evaluates the extent to which external and domestic debt are contracted with a view to achieving/maintaining debt sustainability, and the degree of coordination between debt management and other macroeconomic policies.	3. Government revenues, as percentage of GDP
4. inflation	4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight	4. economic legitimacy: Share of export Trade in Manufactured Goods	(4) Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States: To flesh out this indicators CGD will "develop a taxonomy of fragile states" and will "group those with similar problems (such as conflict, recent post-conflict, long term governance challenges, and others). The project will then address aid effectiveness in fragile states in specific sectors and issue areas."	(4) Human Development: As defined by the following parameters: Access to Improved Water, Access to Sanitation, Education - Primary Completion - female, Education - Primary Completion - total, Education - Primary Enrolment - Ratio of Female to Male, Food Security - Aid as percentage of total consumption, Gender Empowerment Measure, Gender-related Development Index, Health Infrastructure - Expenditures as a percentage of GDP, HIV/AIDS - New AIDS Cases Reported, HIV/AIDS - Percentage of Adult Females Infected, HIV/AIDS - Proportion of Adult population infected, Human Development Index, Infant Mortality, Literacy - total, Literacy - female.	(4) Sound Management of Public Finances	B. Structural Policies 4. Trade- This criterion assesses how the policy framework fosters trade in goods. Two areas are covered: (a) trade regime restrictiveness focusing on the height of tariffs barriers, the extent to which non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are used, and the transparency and predictability of the trade regime; and (b) customs and trade facilitation, including the extent to which the customs service is free of corruption, relies on risk management, processes duty collections and refunds promptly, and operates transparently.	4. Nature of political participation (absence or presence of factionalism)
5. regulatory quality	5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines	5. political effectiveness: Regime/governance stability	(5) Donor Coherence in Fragile States: The aim of donor analysis done under this indicator, "is to gain a greater understanding of: motivations and assumptions behind this conceptual and strategic reorientation; challenges in reconciling mandates and creating effective coordination mechanisms; the resources and instruments used to manage the new joined-up government approach; and efforts to harmonize approaches among the donor community."	(5) Demography: As defined by the following parameters: Life Expectancy - Female, Life Expectancy - Total, Migration Estimated - Net, Population Density, Population Diversity - Ethnic, Population Diversity - Religious, Population Growth, Slum Population - proportion of population, Urban Growth Rate - Annual percentage, Youth Bulge - Pop. Aged 0-14 as a % of Total.	(5) Investments in Human Capital	5. Financial Sector-This criterion assesses the structure of the financial sector and the policies and regulations that affect it. Three dimensions are covered; (a) financial stability; (b) the sector's efficiency, depth, and resource mobilization strength; and (c) access to financial services.	5. % of population experiencing political discrimination

Brookings	Fund for Peace	George Mason	Center for Global Development (CGD)	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFF)	Inst. for State Effectiveness	World Bank	USAID
INDICATORS - CONT'D							
6. government effectiveness	6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline	6. political legitimacy: Regime Governance Inclusion		(6) Environment: As defined by the following parameters: Arable/fertile land availability, Consumption - Commercial energy consumption per capita, Consumption - Use of solid fuels, Disaster Risk Index, Ecological Footprint - Global hectares per capita, Water - annual withdrawal, Water - Renewable available per capita, Forest - annual percentage change in area, Pollution - CO2 Emissions per capita, Pollution - CO2 Emissions per dollar PPP.	(6) Creation of Citizenship Rights through Social Policy	6 Business Regulatory Environment- This criterion assesses the extent to which the legal, regulatory, and policy environment helps or hinders private business in investing, creating jobs, and becoming more productive. The emphasis is on direct regulations of business activity and regulation of goods and factor markets. Three sub- components are measured: (a) regulations affecting entry, exit, and competition; (b) regulations of ongoing business operations; and (c) regulations of factor markets (labor and land).	6. Extent of citizen participation in selecting government
7. rule of law	7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State	7. security effectiveness: Total Residual War, A measure of General Security and vulnerability to political violence			(7) Provision of Infrastructure Services	C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity 7. Gender Equality- This criterion assesses the extent to which the country has enacted and put in place institutions and programs to enforce laws and policies that (a) promote equal access for men and women to human capital development; (b) promote equal access for men and women to productive and economic resources; and (c) give men and women equal status and protection under the law.	7. Asylum requests, as % of population
8. voice and accountability	8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services	8. security legitimacy: State repression, a measure of state repression			(8) Formation of a Market	8. Equity of Public Resource Use- This criterion assesses the extent to which the pattern of public expenditures and revenue collection affects the poor and is consistent with national poverty reduction priorities. Takes into account the extent to which: (a) individuals, groups, or localities that are poor, vulnerable, or have unequal access to services and opportunities are identified; (b) a national development strategy with explicit interventions to assist the groups identified in (a) has been adopted; and (c) the composition and incidence of public expenditures are tracked systematically and their results feedback into subsequent resource allocation decisions.	8. Intensity of most severe ongoing armed conflict
9. control of corruption	9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights	There are an additional three indicators that are not used in the calculation of the overall fragility score; they are referred to as "highlight" columns and they are meant to provide additional information. They are: Regional Effects, Armed Conflict Indicator, and Trajectory			(9) Management of Public Assets	9. Building Human Resources- assesses the national policies and public and private sector service delivery that affect access to and quality of: (a) health and nutrition services, including population and reproductive health, (b) education, Early Child Development programs, training and literacy programs, and (c) prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria	9. Size of displaced population
10. freedom	10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"				(10) Effective Public Borrowing	10. Social Protection and Labor- This criterion assesses government policies in the area of social protection and labor market regulation. In interpreting the guidelines it is important to take into account the size of the economy and its level of development. The focus is on the balance between job creation and social protection, and the availability and coverage of active labor market programs (e.g., retraining and public works). This consists of a composite indicator of five different areas of social protection and labor policy: (a) social safety net programs; (b) protection of basic labor standards; (c) labor market regulations; (d) community driven initiatives; and (e) pension and old age savings programs.	10. Proportion of area affected by ethnic or revolutionary war
11. conflict intensity	11. Rise of Factionalized Elites					11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability- This criterion assesses the extent to which environmental policies foster the protection and sustainable use of natural resources and the management of pollution. Assessment of environmental sustainability requires multi-dimension criteria (i.e. for air, water, waste, conservation management, coastal zones management, natural resources management).	11. State use of political terror

Brookings	Fund for Peace	George Mason	Center for Global Development (CGD)	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)	Inst. for State Effectiveness	World Bank	USAID
INDICATORS - CONT'D							
12. gross human rights abuses	12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors					D. Public Sector Management and Institutions 12. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance- This criterion assesses the extent to which private economic activity is facilitated by an effective legal system and rule-based governance structure in which property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced. Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) legal basis for secure property and contract rights; (b) predictability, transparency, and impartiality of laws and regulations affecting economic activity, and their enforcement by the legal and judicial system; and (c) crime and violence as an impediment to economic activity.	12. Extent of state repression of citizens
13. territory affected by conflict						13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management- This criterion assesses the extent to which there is: (a) a comprehensive and credible budget, linked to policy priorities; (b) effective financial management systems to ensure that the budget is implemented as intended in a controlled and predictable way; and (c) timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting, including timely and audited public accounts and effective arrangements for follow up. Each of these three dimensions should be rated separately.	13. Presence/change in support for militant groups
14. incidence of coups						14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization- This criterion assesses the overall pattern of revenue mobilization--not only the tax structure as it exists on paper, but revenue from all sources as they are actually collected. Separate sub- ratings should be provided for (a) tax policy and; (b) tax administration.	14. Three-year change in real GDP (PPP) per capita
15. political stability and absence of violence						15. Quality of Public Administration- This criterion assesses the extent to which civilian central government staffs are structured to design and implement government policy and deliver services effectively. The key dimensions for assessment are: a. Policy coordination and responsiveness; b. Service delivery and operational efficiency; c. Merit and ethics; d. Pay adequacy and management of the wage bill.	15. Change in foreign investment
16. child mortality						16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector- This criterion assesses the extent to which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees within the executive are required to account for the use of resources, administrative decisions, and results obtained. Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance; (b) access of civil society to information on public affairs; and (c) state capture by narrow vested interests.	16. Poverty rate (% of population living on <\$2 (PPP)/day)
17. access to clean water and improved sanitation							17. Primary commodity exports/total exports
18. undernourishment							18. Three-year inflation rate
19. primary school completion							19. % of population experiencing economic
20. life expectancy							20. Corruption
							21. Extent of rule of law/protection of property
							22. Number of days to start a business
							23. Infant mortality rate
							24. Youth literacy rate
							25. Change in % of population living with
							26. DPT and measles immunization rates
							27. % of population with access to improved
							28. Male/female literacy ratio
							29. Male/female life expectancy ratio
							30. % of GDP spent on military
							31. Deviance from GDP-predicted infant
							32. Deviance from GDP-predicted primary
							33. Cultural and religious freedoms

Brookings	Fund for Peace	George Mason	Center for Global Development (CGD)	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFF)	Inst. for State Effectiveness	World Bank	USAID
SOURCES OF DATA							
Each indicator has its own source, including: World Bank, IMF, Freedom House, Center for Systemic Peace, Archigos 2.8, Economist Intelligence Unit, Political Terror Scale, Political Instability Task Force, UNICEF, Food and Agriculture Organization. The data taken from these sources was the most recent, however there is a slight variation in years.	Uses its own propriety Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) which scans massive sources of data. This entire system is not transparent.	This is quite extensive. Each indicator has further measurements and each of those have a source, as well.		Each indicator is drawn from a different instrument and Source: (1) Governance Indicators: Freedom House, World Bank Group, Governance Matters V, Transparency International, Polity IV, CIA World Factbook, World Development Indicators, World Development Indicators - UNHCR, Freedom House - Annual Survey of Freedom. (2) World Development Indicators, Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom, World Development Indicators, calculated by CIFF, CIA World Factbook, World Bank: Ease of Doing Business indicators, World Bank Group: Governance Matters V, World Development Indicators, Calculated by CIFF. (3) Security and Crime: Uppsala Conflict Database, Fund for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index, CIRI Human Rights Index, World Development Indicators	A mixture of conceptual theories and historical analysis - mostly based on Ghani, Lockhart, Carnahan's, 'An agenda for State-building in the 21st century,' Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter 2006, and 'Closing the Sovereignty Gap,' ODI Working Paper 253, September 2005.	Independently gathered from local offices and surveys.	N/A
NOTES / COMMENTS							
	There are FSI scores for each year from 2005 to 2008	This report is quite different than Brookings and Fund for Peace, has there are more degrees of state fragility.		A lot of indicators. Rankings are sortable and are as recent as 2007. Fantastic individual country reports and overall Fragility discussions. Narratives are updated to 2009 (as opposed to the Ranking Index).	The framework is more of an analysis rather than an index as the indicators are not quantified.	CPIA: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. In 2004, the Bank approved the disclosure of the CPIA ratings for IDA-eligible countries. Beginning with the results of the 2005 exercise, for all IDA eligible countries the numerical scores for all the CPIA criteria, as well as the overall score, are disclosed as the IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) . For the purposes of resource allocation, the CPIA is referred to as the IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI). Publically disclosed in 2006 IDA resources are allocated in per capita terms on the basis of a country's IDA country performance rating (CPR) and, to a limited extent, per capita gross national income (GNI).	N/A

	University of Maryland	UK DFID	Mo Ibrahim Foundation	Global Peace Index
Name of Index	<i>Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger</i>	<i>Proxy List of Fragile States</i>	<i>Index on African Governance</i>	<i>Global Peace Index</i>
Definition of Fragility	State instability is understood to include outbreaks of revolutionary or ethnic war, adverse regime change, and genocide. The occurrence of one or more phenomena weakens societies and regional and global systems.	DFID's working definition of fragile states covers those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves. DFID does not limit its definition of fragile states to those affected by conflict.	This paper does not address "fragility" or "weak state". Instead it discusses governance, and specifically PUBLIC GOODS. It defines public goods as being summarized under the categories below of the indicators.	Does not work off of a definition of fragility, instead, they work off of a definition of "peace". Measures relative peace. Peace is defined as: harmony achieved by the absence of war or conflict. Applied to nations, this would suggest that those not involved in violent conflicts with neighboring states or suffering internal wars would have achieved a state of peace. They also consider the terminology of "positive" peace versus "negative" peace: "negative peace" - an absence of violence, "positive peace": having established what constitutes an absence of violence, is it possible to identify which structures and institutions create and maintain peace?
Methodology	Using a statistical model based on several variables a single score is obtained that captures the overall risk of future instability. Additionally, a statistical confidence level is given for each score.	The proxy list is sourced from UNDP human development indicators 2004 FAO and World Development Indicators 2004 Furthermore, the list is taken from the World Bank CPIA ratings.	Provide very detailed methodology, here are the highlights: Data was normalized, in other words a single composite score was composed for each country by using a common scale. A rank value (1-48) was assigned to each country by arraying the overall scores from highest to lowest. The method used to calculate the index is the Year-to-year Improvement comparison method. Finally, all categories were weighed equally. All missing values were estimated.	This study was conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit. Gaps in the quantitative data were filled with estimates. Indicators were "banded" on a scale of 1-5. Some quantitative data was "normalized". The normalized value was converted from the scale of 0-1 to a 1-5 score to make it comparable with the other indicators. Then the index was weighted: The advisory panel apportioned scores based on a 1-5 scale. Two sub weighted indices were calculated : 1. a measure of how at peace a country is INTERNALLY and 2. how at peace they are EXTERNALLY. The overall composite score and index was then formulated by applying a weight of 60% for internal and 40% for external. The heavier weight applied to internal peace was agreed following MUCH debate. Decision was based on the innovation notion that a greater level of internal peace is likely to lead to lower external conflict.
Underlying Assumptions	The variables chosen are statistically significant to predictive values.	From their literature: Need to work better in fragile states because poverty is so widespread, because they can destabilize regional and global security, and because the costs of late response to crisis are high.	They assume that attention must be focused on citizens and that citizens have the right to expect their governments to adjust as necessary and at the very least provide a minimum level of political goods in their countries.	Based on UN idea of "culture of peace":
Number of Indicators	6	N/A	57	24
Groupings	0	N/A	5	3
Source of Data	Databases: Minorities at Risk, Polity, and International Crisis	www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fr-agilestates-paper.pdf	http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index-2008/	http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/results/rankings.php
Notes/Comments	The confidence range is just as important as the predictive risk score.	This is NOT comparative, probably not what we want		